joining the essential, but all too out requir ing a poten tially entan gling and touchy issues, is to debate the costly ground occu pa tion. Although this contiming of a crucial decision cept of air occu pa tion has received some atten tion lately, the idea is not new. Unfor tu without ever discussing whether nately, the age of the concept has not added or not the move should be made clar ity to its defini tion. Many of the related at all.
can not af ford to com mit dwin dling re sources to missions or capa bili ties that are not com pati ble with US for eign pol icy or the serv ice's core compe ten cies. We need to under stand the defi ni tion and im pli ca tions of air oc cu pa tion because the question may not be "can we?" but "should we?" To many people, the increas ingly fre quent use of the term air occu pa tion is the equiva lent of distant war drums-a precur sor to the up com ing battles over the dwindling budget and relevance in the post-cold-war envi ron ment. This subject is clearly polar ized between those who love and those who hate the con cept. Adding fuel to the fire is the Qua drennial Defense Review (QDR) directed by the Armed Forces Structure Review Act of 1996. The charter of this review is to determine the defense strategy and estab lish a Revised Defense Program through the year 2005. No doubt, the USAF should focus on key strate gic, rather than support ing, roles and missions in order to preserve its autonomy. 1 The USAF's survival as a dominant ser vice will hinge on where it focuses its scarce re sources to prepare for the challenges of the twenty-first century. If current trends con tinue, when the ball drops in Times Square on 1 January 2000, the USAF will be a smaller serv ice, subsist ing on an ever-shrinking defense budget. By the year 2000, the US armed forces will lose another 64,000 activeduty troops, level ing at approxi mately 1,418,000-35 percent smaller than the cold war force of 1987. 2 Procure ment has stag nated for more than a decade, but fiscal year (FY) 1997 was sup posed to be the turn around year. Unfor tu nately, or some may say predicta bly, the FY 1997 procure ment budget dropped again, "falling to the lowest level since before the outbreak of the Korean War."
3 As a share of US gross domes tic prod-uct (GDP), defense spending dropped to 3.2 per cent in 1997 and is forecast to drop to 2.7 per cent in FY 2002-less than half the 6.3 percent of GDP allo cated to defense in the "growth" years of the mid-1980s. 4 In fact, the USAF Program Objec tives Memoran dum 98 (POM FY 1998 -2003 ) leaves $15.7 billion of vali dated, unfunded require ments. 5 In this fiscally constrained envi ron ment, the adage "be careful what you wish for-you may get it" should be on the minds of airpower advo cates covet ing the air occu pa tion mis sion. It could very well be a double-edged sword that expands the relative influ ence of the USAF but also saddles it with a complex, per sis tent, and costly mission. For exam ple, the trend of open-ended commit ments of US airpower-only force packages to "stabi lize" sce nar ios (e.g., Opera tions Provide Comfort and Southern Watch in Iraq) would accel er ate if the concept of air occu pa tion is embraced by our lead ers. How far can this "re sid ual" airpower role be stretched before it af fects our abil ity to re spond to ma jor con tin gen cies or a true peer competi tor (e.g., China)?
The USAF must en sure that it asks the right ques tions before embark ing on a seri ous cam paign to "win" the air oc cu pa tion de bate. The discourse on the concept of air occu pa tion has swirled primar ily around issues of how air power could be used in an oc cu pa tion role. Typi cally, the fo cus is on in no va tions in sen sor and weapon technol ogy that could re duce or eliminate the need for troops on the ground. The USAF Scien tific Advi sory Board iden ti fied numer ous sensor require ments for the twenty-first century: low-cost, spacebased surveil lance systems on small satel lites launched on demand; broadband lowfrequency synthetic aper ture radar (SAR) to de tect con cealed tar gets; un at tended seis mic, acous tic, or chemi cal ground sen sors; and de tec tors placed in food, equipment, manufac tur ing fa cili ties, or even in per son nel to meas ure anxiety and stress. 6 Of course, sensors are not a panacea. Dur ing the Vietnam War, the United States had the Ho Chi Minh Trail "wired like a pinball ma chine" with sensors but still failed to stop the flow of North Vietnam ese men and supplies. 7 Even if the sensors of the twenty-first cen tury are more reli able, control requires not only situational awareness but also the po liti cal will and capa bil ity to influ ence or stop unac cept able activ ity. In a politi cally sen si tive envi ron ment, nonle thal weapons The USAF's survival as a dominant service will hinge on where it focuses its scarce resources to prepare for the challenges of the twenty-first century.
would be invalu able-weap ons that inca paci tate rather than kill, or dis able rather than de stroy equip ment. These in clude, for ex am ple, caus tic substances that destroy a weapon's sen sors or la sers that blind the op era tors; "in fra sound" that dis rupts hu man be ings' ca pac ity to function or foam so sticky they cannot move; and lubri cants so slippery that equip ment cannot maintain traction. 8 Before initi at ing a costly sensor and nonlethal-weapon shop ping spree, the USAF must first ask and an swer two impor tant questions:
What do we mean by the term air occu pa tion? What are the US foreign policy impli ca tions of air occu pa tion?
In the minds of many airpower enthu si asts, the USAF may have al ready con ducted air oc cu pa tion campaigns, but is this justi fi ca tion that we should? We must de velop con sen sus on a proper defini tion as it relates to ob jec tives and tasks-only then can we as sess the likely impli ca tions and utility of the concept to our na tional lead ers. If air oc cu pa tion does not align with antici pated US foreign policy, then we cannot afford to commit scarce resources and as sets to a "prod uct" with no mar ket. Conversely, if air occu pa tion is a likely tool that our national leaders will demand, then we must un der stand the im pli ca tions. As the only full-time air power serv ice, it is the re-
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The battleship-symbol of old-style, coercive gunboat diplomacy. Some analysts contend that airpower may replace naval power as the United States' weapon of choice in international conflicts short of war. In fact, it probably already has.
spon si bil ity of the USAF to de fine and ex plore the impli ca tions of air occu pa tion.
What Do We Mean by Air Occupation?
Airpower is the most difficult of all forms of military force to measure, or even to express in precise terms.
-Winston Churchill
The term air occu pa tion usually elicits ei ther a vis ceral re sponse or a pa ro chial man tra. A typi cal re join der to an air oc cu pa tion ad vo cate is "airpower has never held ground." In many cases, people who debate the viabil ity of air oc cu pa tion talk past each other be cause the terms of refer ence are incon sis tent. Add ing fog to the doctrinal landscape is the grab bag of related terms used by airpower advo cates: air control, air dominance, and air pres sure. The American Heritage Diction ary defines oc cu pa tion as "the inva sion, conquest, and con trol of a nation or terri tory by a foreign mili tary force." Accord ing to Gen Ronald Fo gle man, former USAF chief of staff, "In Iraq, we have used land-based and carrier-based air forces to maintain an air occu pa tion of Iraq for the past five years. That op era tion has con tained Iraq, it has en forced UN sanc tions, and it has compelled Saddam Hussein to accept the most intru sive UN inspec tion regime in his tory." 9 If we turn to offi cial joint and USAF doctrine for descrip tive guidance, we find that none of the previ ously mentioned terms-or the word oc cu pa tion-are defined in Joint Pub 
Air Occupation Objectives
Com mon objec tives for gaining control over en emy terri tory are to coerce the oppo si tion, en force sanctions, obtain a buffer zone, ob tain raw and natural resources, control cul tural assimi la tion, annex terri tory, and exact re venge. Depend ing on the objec tives, Paul Se abury and An gelo Co devilla de fine en force ment op tions that in clude merely mak ing the en emy govern ment relin quish its unac cept able objec tives (e.g., the British fol low ing the Ameri can Revolu tion) or at worst, "replac ing its gov ern ment and cleans ing the de feated so ci ety of those respon si ble for the conflict, pun ish ing it, and exact ing repara tions" (e.g., those parts of Ger many oc cu pied by the So vi ets after World War II). 10 It is impor tant to note that the attain ment of these objec tives does not neces sar ily require actual fighting. Merely the threat of force has prompted some twentieth-century govern ments to abandon con ten tious ob jec tives (e.g., Tai wan) or re lin quish control of their country (e.g., Haiti).
So, what are the objec tives of air occu pa tion? Do we mean to imply that airpower is ap pro pri ate for all occu pa tion objec tives and sce nar ios? More than likely, air power is most ap pli ca ble to those less-intrusive scenar ios with objec tives that involve coer cion, enforce ment of sanctions, and creation of a buffer zone-influ enc ing another state but not replac ing a govern ment or annex ing ter ri tory. "The Gulf War confirmed the Air For ce's ever-increasing abil ity to de stroy mili tary things and peo ple, but air power did not dem on strate an abil ity to change gov ern ments." 11 In the Gulf War Air Power Survey, Richard Hal lion described how air occu pa tion was em ployed in Opera tion Desert Storm: "Air power can hold terri tory by deny ing an en emy the ability to seize it, and by deny ing an en emy the use of his forces. And it can seize ter ri tory by con trol ling ac cess to that ter ri tory and movement across it. It did both in the Gulf War."
12
The Gulf War confirmed the Air Force's ever-increasing ability to destroy military things and people, but airpower did not demonstrate an ability to change governments.
The people who decide whether or not to use air power should con sider the scale of con flict or effec tive ness of the cease-fire; the number, disci pline, and account abil ity of con tend ing parties; the effi cacy of local gov ern ment; the degree to which law and order ex ists; and the willing ness of the popula tion at large to coop er ate. 13 The Soviet oc cu pa tion of Afghani stan from 1980 to 1986 eventu ally re lied almost entirely on airpower.
1 4 Failure to under stand the contex tual elements and their impact on airpower ulti mately led to an em bar rass ing and costly Soviet de feat. By rec og niz ing that air occu pa tion applies only to a sub set of the military occu pa tion objec tives, we can focus on a more real is tic and manageable set of tasks to achieve the mission.
Air Occupation Tasks
Carl Builder identi fied four tasks the USAF must accom plish to oper ate in what he calls the constabu lary role: imme di ately engage and sup press heavy weap ons fire; stop sur rep ti tious flights by low and slow fly ers; sup press street disor ders and violence; and insert/recover a small package of people and equip ment in austere condi tions. 1 5 Although these are impor tant tasks, air occu pa tion entails more than merely function ing as air police. The search for appli ca ble occu pa tion tasks could begin with Army doctrine.
Army Field Man ual (FM) 100-5, Op era tions, out lines postcon flict opera tions that appear to be likely oc cu pa tion tasks: con trol popu la tion and refugees, control prison ers, mark mine fields, destroy unex ploded ordnance, pro vide emergency health service and hu mani tar ian assis tance, provide emergency res to ra tion of utilities, and support the social and civil-affairs needs of the popula tion. 16 If we dig deeper, we find an other set of pos si ble oc cu pa tion tasks de fined in FM 100-23, Peace Op era tions: obser va tion and monitor ing of truces and cease-fires, resto ra tion and main te nance of order and stabil ity, protec tion of hu mani tar ian assis tance, guaran tee and de nial of movement, enforce ment of sanc tions, and the estab lish ment and super vi sion of pro tected zones. 17 Unfor tu nately, this com para tive method exem pli fies a common handi cap of air power ad vo cates-our de pend ence on Army termi nol ogy. Accord ing to airpower his to rian Phil lip Meil in ger, "the Army pro vided a ready vo cabu lary for early air men, but by adopting a lexicon that centered on sur face warfare, advo cates of land-based airpower became trapped in a prison house of lan guage. They contin ued to rely on an adopted language that not only circum scribed their thinking, but also included an in creas ingly inade quate collec tion of terms and catego ries to describe the nature of air war fare and its objec tives." 1 8 This warning invites the question, Do we merely step through the tasks of a tradi tional mili tary occu pa tion and apply airpower, or do we start with a blank piece of paper? Rather than build our defi ni tion on a clas si cal per cep tion that relegates airpower to a merely sup port ing role, we should re con sider the likely air occu pa tion objec tives: coerce the enemy, enforce sanctions, and deny the use of terri tory. Air occu pa tion tasks to achieve these objec tives would include a com bi na tion of presence, intel li gence, sur veil lance, recon nais sance, humani tar ian airdrops and air lift, and pu ni tive strikes. The last two tasks pro vide the "car rot and stick" of co er cion and en force ment. If we stopped there, we would forgo a tre men dous tool: aer ial psy cho logi cal opera tions. In his book Oc cu pa tion, Eric Carlton makes a very impor tant point: "Con trol is nor mally achieved through a combi na tion of force which induces com pli ance, and persua sion and/or indoc tri na tion which gen er ates a sense of com mit ment. In other words, control is either attained by com pul sion, which in the end, is frequently counter-productive, or by some kind of value-consensus which is often very diffi cult to effect, but which can pay handsome divi dends." 1 9 Many of the stud ies ad dress ing the con cept of air oc cu pa tion fo cus on co er cion but fail to ex plore value control, which was so expertly em ployed by Gen Douglas MacArthur during the occu pa tion of Japan after World War II. Of course, fear that Japan would fall into the sphere of commu nism was the primary moti va tion for the seemingly al tru is tic US oc cu pa tion pol icy: "Never be fore in re corded his tory had a great power moved in upon another, tak ing over its affairs almost completely at first, gradually relin quish ing control, and fi nally restor ing sover eignty with such a minimum of friction and such a large measure of be nevo lence." 20 Some form of physical repres sion may be nec es sary, but focus ing on the cultural as pects to exploit the popula tion's exist ing sys tem of checks, balances, and norms is the key to long-term success. In fact, psycho logi cal op era tions to win the hearts and minds of the popu la tion are probably easier to conduct with out the intru sive "in your face" presence of ground troops. Some ready exam ples of aer ial psycho logi cal tasks are leaflet drops, tele vi sion program ming, and radio broad casts-this would also include denial of these me di ums to subver sive groups.
Ac com plish ing air occu pa tion tasks to achieve the asso ci ated ob jec tives may re quire noth ing more than combin ing exist ing tech nol ogy and systems in new and inno va tive ways (e.g., gunships; unmanned aerial vehi cles [UAV]; air borne warn ing and con trol sys tem [AWACS] aircraft; joint surveil lance, target at tack ra dar sys tem [JSTARS] air craft; V-22 Os preys; and space-based assets). As we con sider the possi bili ties, one nagging question per sists: given the doctrinal void on the sub-76 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1997 ject of occu pa tion, is air occu pa tion an appro pri ate term?
Some form of physical repression may be necessary, but focusing on the cultural aspects to exploit the population's existing system of checks, balances, and norms is the key to long-term success.
Appropriateness of the Term Air Occupation
Con ven tional inter na tional law recog nizes only one form of military occu pa tion: bellig er ent occu pa tion. Accord ing to the Hague Regu la tions and the Fourth Geneva Conven tion of 1949, "as long as the terri tory as a whole is in the power and under the control of the occu pant and as long as the latter has the ability to make his will felt every where in the terri tory within a reason able time, military occu pa tion exists from a legal point of view." 21 The classi cal defini tion of bel ligerent occu pa tion recog nizes that armed conflict is not always a prereq ui site. In some cases, merely the threat to use force coerced a gov ern ment to relin quish control of its terri tory (e.g., Haiti). Ar ti cle two of the Fourth Ge neva Conven tion states that "bellig er ent oc cu pa tion and the re spon si bili ties of oc cu pants shall apply even to an occu pa tion that meets with no armed resis tance."
22
If the opera tion is labeled an "occu pa tion," the occu pier is bound by inter na tional law to certain respon si bili ties: the occu py ing power is not per mit ted to an nex the oc cu pied ter ri tory, is expected to "respect and main tain the politi cal and other insti tu tions that ex ist, and is respon si ble for the manage ment of public order and civil life in the terri tory un der its con trol." 23 The pur pose of the law of oc cu pa tion is to prevent the impo si tion of dis rup tive changes in the occu pied terri tory and balance the occu pant's military require ments with humani tar ian inter ests. 2 4 The utopian nature of the law of occu pa tion has prompted the United States and other states victo ri ous in war to avoid label ing op era tions in con quered ter ri tory as oc cu pa tions, thus preclud ing the restric tions and re spon si bili ties. Common excuses include the follow ing: the use of force was in support of another state whose govern ment asked for in ter ven tion (e.g., the Sovi ets in Afghani stan and the United States in Grenada); the occu pants were inter ested in perma nent control over enemy terri tory (e.g., Iraq taking Kuwait and In do ne sia tak ing East Timor); or dis putes by warring factions over the historic ownership of ter ri tory (e.g., Israeli-occupied ter ri to ries). Another more recent excuse for not in vok ing the term oc cu pa tion is to avoid cre at ing the impres sion that the occu pant plans to stay in the terri tory for a long time (e.g., Op era tions Pro vide Com fort and Southern Watch in Iraq). 25 Clearly, use of the term oc cu pa tion is a con tem po rary taboo that places a cloud of doubt over the utility of the term air occu pa tion. Rather than carry all the baggage asso ci ated with oc cu pa tion, perhaps we should consider an alter na tive term.
Alternative for the Term Air Occupation
As mentioned earlier, many terms compete with air occu pa tion in the intel lec tual marketplace: air control, air pressure, and air domi nance, to name a few. Unfor tu nately, none of these prevail ing terms adequately captures the air occu pa tion objec tives and tasks defined earlier. Air control and air pressure are not appro pri ate because they appear to focus ex clu sively on coer cion. Although air domi nance is the most likely alter na tive, it is nor mally asso ci ated with air supe ri or ity and air su prem acy-a prereq ui site but not the under ly ing goal. Regard less of whether we con ducted air occu pa tion before or after hostili ties, the primary desire would be to achieve our goals without war. Surely we would not con duct air occu pa tion for its own sake, but to achieve politi cal objec tives-a better state of peace. As Capt James Poss of the Na val War Col lege theorized, how is that differ ent from AIR OCCUPATION 77 the gunboat diplo macy the US Navy em ployed for years? 26 Sir James Cable defined gun boat diplo macy as "the use or threat of lim ited naval force, other wise than as an act of war, in order to secure advan tage, or to avert loss, either in the further ance of an in ter na tional dis pute or else against for eign na tion als within terri tory or the juris dic tion of their own state." 27 Ul ti mately, gunboat diplo macy was noth ing more than in ter ven tion: "the in ter fer ence of one state or govern ment in the affairs of an other," accord ing to the diction ary defini tion. Although hesitant to intro duce another term into the arena, the USAF could reduce some of the in tel lec tual re sis tance to air oc cu pa tion by using the term air inter ven tion instead. This could be used to capture the mili tary opera tions other than war (MOOTW) mis sions that can be conducted exclu sively with airpower: enforc ing sanctions, enforcing exclu sion zones, and conduct ing peace opera tions. In fact, if we take the pulse of current doctrine and politi cally correct think ing, it appears that occu pa tion has been re named peace opera tions, which are "mili tary opera tions to support diplo matic efforts to reach a long-term politi cal settle ment and cate go rized as peacekeeping opera tions and peace enforce ment opera tions. Peace opera tions are conducted in conjunc tion with the vari ous diplo matic activi ties neces sary to se cure a nego ti ated truce and resolve the con flict. Mili tary peace op era tions are tai lored to each situation and may be conducted in support of dip lo matic ac tivi ties be fore, dur ing or af ter conflict."
28 For ex am ple, if we in sert airpower into the defini tion for peace enforce ment found in Joint Pub 1-02 (23 March 1994), it would read, "appli ca tion of airpower or the threat of its use, nor mally pur su ant to in ter na tional authori za tion, to com pel com pli ance with reso lu tions or sanc tions designed to maintain or restore peace and or der."
There are two pri mary ad van tages to us ing the term air inter ven tion. First-and most im por tant-it unloads the paro chial and legal bag gage asso ci ated with oc cu pa tion . Second, us ing in ter ven tion links the concept to the exten sive intel lec tual discourse on why nations in ter fere with the affairs of another state. Air in ter ven tion should be "marketed" to the com bat ant command ers in chief (CINC) as merely one of the many tools avail able to deal with MOOTW scenar ios. It is not surpris ing that AFDD 2-3, the USAF doctrine document on MOOTW, does not mention the concept of air occu pa tion-af ter all, it is a taboo term. Re mov ing the concep tual shackles by using a dif fer ent term may be the cata lyst that in vigo rates the USAF to explore-and eventu ally de fine-what it believes to be true about the ex clu sive employ ment of airpower to coerce and control.
US Foreign Policy Implications of Air Occupation
Airpower is an unusually seductive form of military strength, in part because, like modern courtship, it appears to offer gratification without commitment.
-Eliot Cohen Director, Gulf War Air Power Survey
Just as in war, one can also apply airpower in MOOTW to achieve politi cal goals. The con cept and practice of exclu sive reli ance on air power to achieve national objec tives is noth ing new-historic precedents exist. The ques tion is, Can we conclude that our leaders will call upon air power to con duct air oc cu pa tion missions in the future? If we deter mine there is no demand for air occu pa tion, we must de cide whether the prod uct is wor thy of the time and en ergy nec es sary to cre ate a mar ket for it. Alter na tively, if we believe that air oc cu pa tion will be a popular military tool in the future, we must ensure that we understand the impli ca tions and shape expec ta tions. To assess the air occu pa tion mar ket, we can project into the future using the current na tional se cu rity strat egy (NSS) as a pre dic tor of need. Of course, actions speak louder than words-to capture this variable, we can ex trapo late from the US inter ven tion trends of the last 15 years.
Historic Precedents-Air Control
In 1950 El vira Frad kin con ceived of an ex am ple of military air control theory. She proposed cre at ing a United Na tions Air Po lice Pa trol (UNAPP) to allow the United States and So viet Un ion to dis arm by en trust ing the pre mier instru ment of military power (i.e., airpower) to the United Nations. 29 Her justi fi ca tion for using air polic ing was simple: "Air power has the advan tage of imme di ate avail abil ity as a disci pli nary force. It has the fur ther advan tage of being able to exer cise dis ci pline with out in ter fer ence in the nor mal rou tine of any nation's peaceful domes tic af fairs. And in the third place it can reach any area on the earth's surface without effec tive in ter ven tion." 30 Gill Wilson, president of the National Aero nau tic Asso cia tion at the time, stated that "the use of an inter na tional air police by the United Nations has intrigued the imagi na tion of many; national sover eignty cannot ex ist without control of the air." 3 1 Although Fradkin's disar ma ment hypothe sis is ques tion able, she did broach an inter est ing propo si tion predicated on the inher ent strengths of airpower to unilat er ally influ ence and control the actions of another na tion.
A more practi cal precedent for air occu pa tion is the British air control expe ri ence in Iraq from 1920 to 1939. Anyone who has fol lowed the air occu pa tion debate is probably weary of compari sons with the British in 1920, but the similari ties are striking and worth repeat ing. Although victo ri ous in World War I, Britain still "had to deal with res tive popula tions and disor ders of all sorts in its empire." 32 Tribal warfare and border con flicts were common in the Middle East and Africa-as is the case today. Costs asso ci ated with garri son ing all these lo ca tions were tre men dous and quickly became unac cept able to the British people. As a cheaper alter na tive, the Royal Air Force (RAF) pro posed the ex clu sive use of airpower to con trol the ter ri to ries of the empire. This proposal was ac cepted, and in 1919 Winston Churchill de clared that "the first duty of the RAF is to gar ri son the British Empire." 3 3 This initia tive not only filled a need for the British govern ment but also prevented the RAF from being down sized, allow ing it to capture a larger share of the dwin dling military-resources pie. For more than eight years, the RAF suc cess fully accom plished the air-control goals of long-term po liti cal sta bil ity, paci fi ca tion, and ad mini stra tion. 34 Ree mer gence of the is sue of air oc cu pa tion or air control is not surpris ing. The US eco nomic "empire" spans the globe-a world torn by increas ing ethnic, relig ious, and na tion al is tic ten sions. The task and costs of pro tect ing our inter ests in this volatile envi ron ment are enormous. Some people may say that the rekin dling of the air occu pa tion dis cus sion is driven by the USAF's fear of down siz ing initia tives-spe cifi cally, the QDR. Al though this may be true, it does not discount the precedence of achieving politi cal goals through the exclu sive employ ment of airpower to success fully control activ ity on the ground. Of course, we must be cogni zant of the fact that this took place in a low-threat en vi ron ment, in the desert, and with very lim ited objec tives. In fact, these condi tions are very similar to those that exist in Opera tions South ern Watch and Pro vide Com fort in Iraq. Ob vi ously, a Vietnam or Bosnia scenario of fers a dis tinctly dif fer ent set of chal lenges. Re gard less of the threat envi ron ment or ge og ra phy of future US inter ven tions, the NSS should still apply.
National Security Strategy
The central goals of the United States, as defined in the cur rent NSS, are to "en hance our se cu rity with mili tary forces that are ready to fight and with effec tive repre sen ta tion abroad, bol ster America's economic revi tali za tion, and pro mote de moc racy abroad." 35 The un der ly ing prem ise of the document is that economi cally sta ble and democratic states "are less likely to threaten our inter ests and more likely to coop er ate with the United States to meet secu rity threats." 36 At first glance, this may seem uto pian; nonethe less, the desire to enlarge the com mu nity of "se cure and demo cratic na tions"
AIR OCCUPATION 79

Enforcing sanctions and creating buffer zones-Operation Provide Comfort. Of the many historic occupation objectives, air occupation most likely applies to less intrusive scenarios that attempt to coerce, enforce sanctions, or create buffer zones.
was used as justi fi ca tion for the US inter ven tion in Haiti. 37 Of course, this discounts the fact that prevent ing a poten tial refugee crisis on the shores of Florida, a key elec toral state, was politi cally expe di ent. The NSS supports the concept of a less intru sive air occu pa tion op tion-al low ing the indige nous soci ety to re solve its problems and using the military merely to provide a window of oppor tu nity: "We rec og nize, how ever, that while force can de feat an aggres sor, it cannot solve under ly ing problems. Democ racy and economic pros per ity can take root in a struggling soci ety only through local solu tions carried out by the soci ety itself. We must use military force se lec tively, rec og niz ing that its use may do no more than pro vide a win dow of op por tu nity for a soci ety-and diplo macy-to work." 38 The NSS defines three catego ries of na tional inter est that merit the use of US armed forces: vital inter ests that affect the survival and secu rity of the nation (e.g., defend ing US bor ders and US economic vital ity); im por tant in ter ests but not vital to national survival (e.g., Bosnia); and humani tar ian inter ests. 3 9 Al though humani tar ian inter ests are proba bly more numer ous, the NSS is hesitant to em ploy military force in these situations because "the military is not the best tool to address hu mani tar ian con cerns." 40 On the other end of the spec trum are the less nu mer ous vi tal inter ests, which most likely would require the focused efforts of all aspects of the mili-tary instru ment of power since the stakes are too high.
This still leaves a sizable number of prospec tive impor tant inter ests. NSS crite ria for the use of mili tary force in these situa tions in clude a high probabil ity that forces can achieve the objec tives, assur ance that costs and risks of their use are commen su rate with the in ter ests at stake, and evi dence that other means have been tried and have failed to achieve the objec tives (e.g., Haiti and Bos nia). 41 Given the fact that these are only im por tant inter ests, the threshold of accept able pain is likely to be quite low. This is exac er bated by the gen eral NSS cri te rion for the use of mili tary forces any time: a rea son able like li hood of support from the American people and their elected repre sen ta tives. 42 Any sig nifi cant risk to American lives will probably be perceived as unac cept able.
All these factors are predic tors of a market for a less costly and lower-risk air occu pa tion op tion. If one accepts the premise that peace op era tions is a po liti cally cor rect way of say ing oc cu pa tion, then the follow ing NSS statement would indi cate not only a market but also a "growth" mar ket for air oc cu pa tion: "In ad di tion to prepar ing for major regional contin gen cies and overseas presence, we must prepare our forces for peace opera tions to sup port democ racy or conflict resolu tion. From tradi tional peacekeeping to peace enforce ment, multi na tional peace opera tions are sometimes the best way to prevent, con tain or resolve conflicts that could other wise be far more costly and deadly." 
Actions-Intervention Trends
The NSS allows us to project the "intent" of the US gov ern ment, but this is only a rec ipe of for eign policy-the proof is in the pudding. Pre vi ous actions may be a better predic tor to ex trapo late US inter ven tion policy into the twenty-first century. The United States has never been shy about involv ing itself in the in ter nal af fairs and do mes tic poli tics of other na tions to satisfy its national inter ests. The use of gunboat diplo macy and marines was a sta ple of the US political-military landscape in Central America. Although US opera tions are usually cloaked in the guise of moral cru sades, few of the early in ter ven tions were con ducted "exclu sively to promote the rights of in di vidu als and groups over the rights of state sov er eignty." 44 The major ity of these forays were prompted not by vital inter ests but by im por tant inter ests.
Since 1945 over 160 major conflicts have oc curred, and the US military was deployed over 242 times. In Janu ary 1990 alone, 32 ma jor armed conflicts occurred-of these, 29 were ethnic, relig ious, or racial. In addi tion to the standard bogey men (e.g., terror ism, weapons of mass destruc tion [WMD], relig ion, ethnic ity), there are other rea sons that this trend may continue-if not ac cel er ate. First and foremost is the fact that we are no longer constrained by super power com pe ti tion with the So viet Un ion and therefore may perceive inter ven tion as less risky. 46 An other predic tor, exem pli fied in the NSS, is the empha sis on democ racy and human rights in US foreign policy. This may mean that the United States will increas ingly jus tify in ter ven tion to promote American values as well as defend Ameri can in ter ests. 4 7 None theless, Ameri can eco nomic in ter ests will re main a driv ing fac tor. In fact, this may ex plain why in ter ven tion senti ment is still so strong even though the threat of com mu nism and its con tain ment are no longer paramount. Stephen Sha lom labeled this under ly ing economic mo ti va tion theory the "Impe rial Alibis."
The Soviet Union did indeed behave in an imperial manner and did have armed forces far larger than needed for its legitimate self-defense. But U.S. officials have always AIR OCCUPATION 81 exaggerated the Bolshevik bogey in order to justify their own inflated military machine, which has primed the U.S. economy and been deployed against the forces of social change in the Third World that challenge U.S. hegemony and economic interests. 4 8 This poignant statement suggests that US pol icy will likely continue to be driven by eco nomic inter ests-that is, capital ism. Even if we accept this premise, there will still be "calls for inter ven tion anywhere there is di saster, disor der, or other large scale suffer ing that exceeds the capac ity or incli na tion of a re gional govern ment." 4 9 British air vice mar shal R. A. Mason highlighted an inter est ing para dox that may also expand US involve ment in regional conflicts:
If regional conflict or instability derives from ethnic, racial, national or territorial disputes, those neighboring countries with the greatest interests at stake may also be those whose intervention is likely to be regarded with the greatest suspicion by one or more of the contestants. Conversely, if disinterest is to be a criterion of military intervention to resolve a conflict, sustain peace or even protect humanitarian activities, what motivation will compel a state to allocate resources and perhaps incur casualties for a cause in which by definition it has little, if any, interest?
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The United States will likely feel com pelled to inter vene in these regional conflicts for moral reasons, regard less of the NSS. Thus, al though the rec ipe may call for lim ited and fo cused use of mili tary forces, credi bil ity as a benevo lent super power may demand more. Regard less of "why" the United States chooses to inter vene, risk aversion will be a para mount compo nent. Many times this has led to the selec tion of airpower to minimize the risk of casual ties. "Air warfare remains dis tinctly American-high tech, cheap on lives, and quick; to America's enemies-past, cur rent, and poten tial-it is the distinctly Ameri can form of mili tary in timi da tion." 51 In fact, a Brookings In sti tu tion study that exam ined 215 inter na tional inci dents short of war be tween 1946 and 1975 in volv ing the United States concluded that land-based airpower was the most ef fec tive form of mili tary power.
It would appear that positive outcomes occurred more frequently when land-based combat aircraft were used than when major ground force or naval force components were introduced. It is worth noting that, like nuclear-associated units, land-based aircraft were never used as a latent instrument. It is likely that target actors view the distinctive capabilities of these two types of forces with greater alarm and that they also perceive their use as signaling greater determination on the part of U.S. policy makers.
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Implications
The US Navy has a long tradi tion of using sea power-or gunboat diplo macy-for coer cive di plo macy. Some analysts contend that "airpower may replace na val power as the United States' weapon of choice in in ter na tional con flicts short of war." 53 In fact, it probably al ready has. If we are able to inter vene successfully without risking a signifi cant number of lives or incur ring high logis tics costs, we may find it easier to consoli date domes tic and in ter na tional will. The big pay off for air oc cu pa tion could be the ability to inter vene sooner, when the risks are lower and the chances of suc cess greater. 54 A telling exam ple is Bosnia. How much easier would the conflict resolu tion be in this now war-torn region if we had in ter vened before the atrocities and ethnic cleans ing of the 1990s had occurred? The un der ly ing economic problems that ulti mately re kin dled the eth nic em bers would have been far easier to deal with in an atmo-sphere of only "historic" tension. Nonethe less, we must be wary of mistak ing air oc cu pa tion asa quick fix to prob lems that re quire a long-term com mit ment to achieve lasting conflict reso lu tion. Look ing back at the Brit ish air con trol ex pe ri ence in Iraq, "the most seri ous longterm conse quences of ready avail abil ity of air con trol was that it de vel oped into a sub sti tute for admini stra tion. The speed and simplic ity of air attack was preferred to the more timeconsuming and painstak ing inves ti ga tion of griev ances and disputes." A primary concern should be the fear of mak ing in ter ven tion too easy by substi tut ing air power for logic. We may find in fea si ble in ter ven tions being executed because we have sig nifi cantly re duced the cost of be ing wrong. "The avail abil ity of low-cost, low-risk op tions borne from new techniques and new tech nolo gies may tempt us to make the mis take of in ter ven ing in unwar ranted cases, inter ven ing because we can, rather than because we should" (empha sis added). 56 In fact, many of the early US inter ven tions were charac ter ized by unclear goals that made the defini tion of suc cess (i.e., a bet ter state of peace) nearly im pos si ble to deter mine. 57 The dilemma of de cid ing if we should become involved is only go ing to get more diffi cult as we face a grow ing constel la tion of ethnic, relig ious, and na tion al is tic conflicts. In addi tion, if the sce nario is uncer tain, the deci sion to extri cate our selves may be equally diffi cult. The current opera tions designed to "protect" the Kurds and Shi ites in Iraq are per fect ex am ples of this dilemma: what is the achiev able end state that will signal success and allow total re de ploy ment of US airpower? US foreign pol icy and inter ven tion trends indi cate a grow ing need for a less costly and lower-risk al ter na tive to "troops on the ground." Airpower could fill this need, but there are dan ger ous impli ca tions that the USAF must be pre pared to cope with-in this case, ig no rance is not bliss.
Conclusion
My message . . . is that the pioneering days of aviation are not over. Fully developing and exploiting airpower is an enduring challenge. In particular, the Air Force has specific responsibilities for ensuring airpower serves the nation which we must discharge ever more effectively in the future.
-Maj Gen Charles D. Link Air oc cu pa tion is an in tel lec tu ally in ter est ing yet conten tious concept. This is famil iar ter ri tory for airpower advo cates who have faced skep ti cism for dec ades-in many cases, a by-product of promis ing too much. Of course, if we allowed our vision and theories to be defined only by what the "masses" thought was pos si ble, we would proba bly still be relegated to mail deliv ery and obser va tion du ties. As the only full-time airpower service, the USAF has a singu lar respon si bil ity to ex plore and validate new appli ca tions of airpower and space power. We must not allow our selves to get stuck in the rut of "mainstream" doctrine. In the words of Carl Builder, "we are accus tomed to seeing doctrine grow, evolve, and mature, particu larly where doctrine applies to what we care most about-our tradi tional roles and missions in the mainstream of the Air Force. We seem to have more diffi culty, however, with nurtur ing doctrine off the mainstream roles and mis sions-what I call the doctrinal fron tiers." 58 Al though Builder makes a valid point, evolv ing doctrine should also be flexible and hon est enough to ex clude new air power roles that are un nec es sary or frivo lous, even if they are techno logi cally possi ble. There must be more to airpower theory than "we can, therefore we should." In a world of dwindling budg ets, the USAF must be honest brokers with the nation's limited resources. Conse quently, it must be wary of accept ing roles and missions that will have little impact on the vital inter ests of the nation but consume tre men dous re sources, ei ther be cause of their sin gu lar cost or uncon trolled frequency. The only way to bring clarity to what Builder la bels the "doctrinal frontier" is to ask and an swer the right ques tions early in the pro-cess.
What Do We Mean by Air Occupation?
The term air occu pa tion can be very perplex ing. Un for tu nately, nei ther air occu pa tion nor oc cu pa tion is defined in joint or USAF doc trine-only the legal impli ca tions of the term oc cu pa tion can ex plain this void. Of the many his toric oc cu pa tion ob jec tives, air oc cu pa tion most likely applies to less intru sive scenar ios that attempt to coerce, enforce sanctions, or cre ate buffer zones. Probable air occu pa tion tasks to achieve these objec tives would in clude a combi na tion of presence, intel li gence, surveil lance, recon nais sance, psycho logi cal opera tions, humani tar ian airdrops and airlift, and puni tive strikes. The USAF may reduce some of the intel lec tual resis tance to air occu pa tion by using the term air in ter ven tion instead. This would unload the pa ro chial and legal baggage asso ci ated with oc cu pa tion and link it to the exten sive dis course on inter ven tion theory.
US Foreign Policy Implications of Air Occupation
Gen eral Fogle man equates the problems of to day's complex, multi po lar world to the heads of the mythical serpent Hydra-when one is cut off, two grow in its place. 59 Al though the USAF can not solve all our na tion's mili tary problems alone, it may be able to solve some of them. The con cept and prac tice of exclu sive reli ance on airpower to achieve na tional ob jec tives is not new-his toric prece dents ex ist. The USAF must de fine those situa tions in which exclu sive use of airpower may be the most desir able and effec tive course of ac tion. The warning from Dr. Larry Cable should be heeded to ensure that "jointness" does not become dogma: "Correctly em ployed joint oriented doctrine allows the or ches tra tion of comple men tary capaci ties for the several forces under a unitary chain of com mand. Im prop erly em ployed it al lows for the pol icy equiva lent of the Spe cial Olym pics in which every one gets to play and every one is rewarded from mere partici pa tion regardless of the effec tive ness or success of their hav ing taken part." 6 0
The current NSS crite rion for costs and risks that are commen su rate with the in ter est at stake, cou pled with US in ter ven tion trends, in di cates the likeli hood of a growing market for an air occu pa tion option. The big payoff for air oc cu pa tion could be early con sen sus to in ter vene sooner, when the risks are lower and the chances of success greater. Nonethe less, we must be wary of mis tak ing air oc cu pa tion as a quick fix to problems that require long-term commit ment to achieve lasting con flict resolu tion. Our task is to ensure that US lead ers un der stand the al lure of "low cost" in ter ven tion and guard against its misuse. A pri mary con cern should be the fear of mak ing in ter ven tion too easy and substi tut ing airpower for logic-inter ven ing because we can rather than because we should .
Bottom Line
Even if one disagrees with the broad answers pro vided in this arti cle, the questions are still valid and must be answered before embark ing on a se ri ous cam paign to "win" the air oc cu pa tion debate. Air occu pa tion-alter na tively, air inter ven tion-is a viable concept as long as we under stand that it is not appro pri ate for all scenar ios. As the only full-time airpower ser-vice, the USAF must develop and pub lish air occu pa tion doctrine to provide guid ance on what it believes to be true about ap pli ca bil ity, objec tives, tasks, techniques, and proce dures. This doctrinal devel op ment and assess ment process should include the "bat tle labs" recently created by the USAF to pro vide "a place where new ideas will be taken seri ously." 6 1 Although the USAF should fo cus on key strate gic, rather than support ing, roles and missions to preserve its auton omy, it must also ensure that the concept of air occu pa tion is not oversold to the point of cre at ing a market that dominates its exis tence. Every sortie and dollar commit ted to un nec es sary roles and missions is a resource lost to prepar ing for the military's primary task, as defined in Joint Vision 2010: to fight and win our nation's wars. 
